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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant James Lancaster suffered a myocardial infarction 
on February 17, 1984, during the course of his employment. His 
heart attack meets the definition of an "accident" as that term 
has been interpreted for purposes of Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Law. Furthermore, all of the medical evidence 
relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge clearly established 
a cause and effect relationship between the appellant's work 
activities and his heart attack. Because Mr. Lancaster has met 
the requirements entitling him to an award of benefits, the 
order of the Industrial Commission denying compensation should 
be overturned as being arbitrary and capricious and contrary to 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IN HEART ATTACK CASES, USUAL EXERTION IS SUFFICIENT 
TO SHOW AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
A. Utah Law Requires Only Usual Exertion For Purposes 
Of Showing An Industrial Accident. 
As stated previously by both Appellant and Respondent, the 
test for evaluating the compensability of heart attack cases in 
Utah is two pronged: first, the applicant must show that an 
"accident" occurred and second, the applicant must establish 
that there was a "causal connection between the accident and 
the injury claimed." Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 
657 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). In Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980) this Court 
identified the requirements of an "accident" for purposes of 
workmen's compensation law: 
In this jurisdiction, it is settled beyond question 
an internal failure brought about by exertion in 
the course of employment may be an accident within 
the meaning of 35-1-45, without the requirement 
that the injury result from some incident which 
happened suddenly and is identifiable at a definite 
time and place. (Footnote omitted). 
* * * 
It is equally well settled the injury received may 
be accidental even though the exertion is that 
required in the ordinary course of employment. If 
an employee incurs unexpected injuries, including 
internal failures, caused by the ordinary duties of 
his employment he is eligible for compensation 
under 35-1-45. (Footnotes omitted). (Emphasis 
added). 
Additional insight was provided in the more recent heart 
attack case of Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, supra, 
which related the term "accident" specifically to heart 
attacks: 
"It [the term accidental] simply means that 'the 
effort exerted, considering the position in which 
the workman was put by the work being done at the 
instant of the injury, was such that an injury, 
unanticipated and unforeseen resulted to the 
workman."1 Id. at 726. (Quoting Continental Baking 
v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 438, 69 P.2d 268 
(1937)) . 
Id. at 1370, Footnote 1. 
It is apparent that the term "accident" has been 
interpreted broadly as to heart attack cases so as to afford 
compensation for injuries, like heart attacks, which are 
precipitated by an employee's employment duties but which 
cannot always be traced to some identifiable incident happening 
suddenly at a definite place and time. So long as a worker can 
show that an unanticipated injury was precipitated, in whole or 
in part, by his regular work activities, a compensable accident 
under U.C.A., §35-1-45 (1953 as amended) is established. 
This conclusion is further confirmed by the decision in Powers 
v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 743 
(1967) wherein the following statement was made: 
The law is well settled that the aggravation or 
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable and that an 
internal failure brought about by exertion in the 
course of employment may be an accident within the 
meaning of the act. (Footnote omitted). 
. . . We are of the of the opinion that in these 
cases we are only concerned with the proposition as 
to whether or not an ordinary exertion as 
contrasted to an unusual exertion caused the injury 
in question. (Emphasis added). 
Contrary to the decisions in Powers, Schmidt and Keller, 
respondents contend that the ordinary-exertion rule was 
repudiated in Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Ut. 2d 373, 
431 P.2d 798 (1967), in favor of the more stringent unusual-
exertion rule. Under the latter rule, unless an applicant can 
demonstrate some unusual exertion, i.e.: exertion different 
from the exertion normally required by his regular employment 
duties, there has been no "accident." Careful review of the 
Mellen decision demonstrates, however, that it does not reject 
the ordinary-exertion rule. The issue in Mellen was whether 
the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying 
benefits to the applicant, and the Court simply held that the 
medical evidence presented in the case did not support a 
finding that the applicant's exertion on the job was a cause of 
his heart attack. Thus, Mellen stands for the proposition that 
where the second prong of the Keller test—causation—is not 
met, the applicant is not entitled to benefits. The decision 
does not, as claimed by respondents, initiate a new standard by 
which to evaluate the first prong of the Keller test. In fact, 
Mellen cited with approval from Justice Wolfe's concurring 
opinion in Purity Biscuit wherein he stated: 
'The Commission should have clear and convincing 
proof that the exertion done as a part of the work, 
whether ordinary or extraordinary, was a factor 
which materially contributed to or caused the death 
or disability.' (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 800. 
In further support of the unusual-exertion rule, 
Respondents cite Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969). They contend 
that Redman is a "landmark" case on the issue of exertion 
rules, setting the precedent now followed in this state. 
(Respondents1 Brief at 7.) In Redman, the Court reversed an 
award of benefits to a truck driver who had suffered a 
herniated disc, once again on grounds there had been no 
competent evidence introduced to show that the applicant's 
usual work activities of sitting and driving had caused his 
injury. At no point did the court state, however, that had the 
applicant been able to establish causation, he still would not 
have prevailed because he was not engaged in any exertion 
unusual to his regular employment. Furthermore, the applicant 
in Redman cited Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 
612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952), a heart/exertion case, in support of 
his position that he had suffered a compensable accident but 
the Court rejected the applicability of Jones stating: 
The Jones case has no kinship here, since it was an 
exertion case involving a death by heart failure as 
well as involving the continuing debate among the 
medical men as to whether exertion and/or the 
degree thereof is a factor in causing heart failure. 
Id. at 286. 
Thus, this Court's clear implication in Redman was that 
exertion cases resulting in heart attacks are evaluated 
differently than cases resulting in back disorders, etc. This 
dual approach is, in fact, the majority view as pointed out in 
appellant's original brief, in that jurisdictions that accept 
the usual-exertion rule in heart cases now outnumber those 
requiring unusual exertion almost two to one. Larson's 
Workmen's Compensation (Desk Ed. Vol*. I, §38.31.) For 
example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Jackson v. Emile 
J. Legere, Inc., 265 A.2d 18, 20 (N.H. 1970), sustained an 
award of benefits in a heart attack case with the following 
analysis: 
It is not necessary, therefore, that there 
be evidence of "unusual strain" in order 
that a heart attack or other injury be 
found to have been accidental because this 
requirement of the statute need not be 
supplied by cause, but may be fulfilled by 
effect. (Citation omitted.) 
"Unusual strain" would be a requirement, 
not as a matter of law, but as a matter of 
fact, only if it were made so by the 
medical testimony. (Citation omitted.) 
This same conclusion was reached by the Louisiana Court 
of Appeals in Roberts v. Sonic Drive-In of Marksville, 441 S.2d 
24 (La. 1983). Therein, the applicant suffered an attack of 
angina pectoris after losing her temper upon finding the 
kitchen of the restaurant she managed dirty from the previous 
night. The Court of Appeals sustained an award of benefits and 
stated: 
Although plaintiff suffered from a pre-
existing arterior sclerotic condition, she 
was nonetheless able to cope with the 
strenuous work until she suffered a work-
stress related accident on March 11, 1981. 
Her accident was caused by her work and 
also partially contributed to by her pre-
existing heart disease. 
Id. at 26. The court then went on to state that if a worker's 
activities entail exertion, stress or strain greater than that 
experienced in a non-work situation and the worker suffers a 
heart attack, "he has made a prima facie showing that the 
accident arose out of, or was connected with employment." 
Roberts at 26. See also, Blair v. INA of Texas, 686 S.W.2d 627 
(Tex.App. 13 Dist. 1984); and Tucker v. Associated Grocers, 
Inc., 473 S.2d 328 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985) ("an accident arises 
out of the employment when it results from some risk to which 
the employee is subjected in the course of his employment and 
to which he would not have been subjected had he not been so 
employed. When the performance of the usual and customary 
duties of a workman causes or contributes to a physical 
breakdown, the statutory requirements for an 'accidental' 
injury are present." (Citation omitted.)). 
As to heart attacks, therefore, Utah clearly follows 
the majority view of accepting compensability based upon usual 
exertion as long as the medical evidence shows that exertion to 
be a cause of the heart attack. In support of their claim that 
unusual-exertion must be present, respondents rely on back 
cases, rather than heart cases. And, as noted above, in cases 
involving heart failure the usual exertion rule is 
overwhelmingly applied. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Redman does stand for 
the unusual-exertion test, this test, contrary L^ ./:dt 
respondents allege, has not been followed consistently in the 
"overwhelming majority of recent cases." In Painter Motor Co. 
v. Ostler, 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980), a L98 0 back case, the 
court affirmed an award of benefits to a claimant who had 
noticed "the onset of intensifying back and shoulder pain" 
after assisting in the installation of some electrical boxes at 
the request of his employer. The sole issue on appeal was 
whether the claimant's injuries were the result of an 
"accident." The court stated: 
We have previously defined the term 
"accident" as an unanticipated, unintended 
occurrence different from what would 
normally be expected to occur in the usual 
course of events. Thus, if an employee 
incurs unexpected injuries, including 
internal failures caused by the duties of 
his employment, he is eligible for 
compensation under 35-1-45. (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
Id. at 97 6 The phrase "caused by the duties of his 
employment" was clarified in a footnote: 
As Justice Wolfe elucidated in Robertson v. 
Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 25, 163 
P.2d 331 (1945): 'thus, where exertion or 
overexertion in the course of employment 
causes disability or death, . , . 
compensation should be allowed. at 3 38 
(dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added). 
Id. at footnote 2. It is significant that the court cited 
Justice Wolfe's dissenting opinion in Robertson, K more 
thorough examination of his opinion perhaps explains some of 
the apparent inconsistencies in various Utah decisions 
discussing exertion and its usefulness in determining whether 
an accidental injury has occurred. Therein, Justice Wolfe 
emphatically stated: 
I agree with Mr. Justice WADE that it is 
not greatly material whether the exertion 
was ordinary for the job or unusually heavy 
if it be definitely established that the 
exertion did, in fact, cause the internal 
failing. 
Robertson at 338. He then went on to explain that where 
unusual exertion is present, it may be easier to identify the 
cause and effect relationship between it as a requirement of 
one's employment and the internal failure suffered by the 
employee. The fact that an employee was not engaged in any 
unusual exertion at the time of his injury, however, does not 
mean he may not have had an "accident." It simply means that 
proving an accident may be more difficult because the cause and 
effect relationship may be harder to establish. In the instant 
case, Mr. Lancaster has proven that his work activities on 
February 17th, contributed to the heart attack he suffered. 
His own physician stated that had Lancaster not been working 
that day, he likely would not have had a myocardial 
infarction. (R. at 291.) Furthermore, Dr. Perry, in his 
testimony before the Commission, assigned a ten percent 
causative factor to Mr. Lancaster's work activities in bringing 
on the heart attack. Therefore, because Lancaster has 
established a definite causal link between the exertion 
required by his job duties and his heart failure, he has proven 
a compensable accident. 
B. Appellant Lancaster Has Proven An Accident Under 
Either The Usual Or Unusual Exertion Test. 
Even if the Court should find that the unusual-exertion 
test Is the appropriate test to be applied in determining 
whether an "accident" has occurred in heart attack cases, 
appellant Lancaster has met the test. On the day of his heart 
attack and for several days prior thereto, i t had been snowing 
heavily and several feet of fresh snow had been deposited on 
the ground before Mr. Lancaster reported for work, When he 
arrived at his employment, the snow was still falling, the wind 
was blowing, and it was unusually cold. Mi: Lancaster had to 
wade through snow approximately four feet deep for a distance 
of 50 to 60 feet in order to get to and start the backhoe and 
the i urane i n which he worked. Although 5 0 to 6 0 feet may not 
be a considerable distance to travel on dry ground, traversing 
such a distance through snow depths of approximately four feet 
requires a significant amount of effort. Once he arrived at 
his backhoe, Mr. Lancaster had to climb two substantial steps 
in order to get into the cab. Although the cab itself was 
heated, Mr. Lancaster did leave his backhoe on several 
occasions pri or to suffering his heart attack and on each 
occasion he was again exposed to the bitter cold weather and he 
was forced to climb up and down the steps. And finally, 
because of the depth of the snow that had fal ] en, the ride in 
the backhoe while clearing snow from the roadways was extremely 
rough and jarring. 
Against this undisputed evidence, respondents claim 
that because Mr. Lancaster was an experienced heavy-equipment 
operator, and because he had been working at Brian Head for 
several months prior to this incident, his work activities on 
the day in question cannot be considered "unusual." This 
argument falls squarely into the trap identified by Professor 
Larson in his discussion of cases involving exposure to heat, 
cold and other natural risks. Therein he states: 
Sunstroke, heat prostration, freezing, 
pneumonia, and other effects of exposure to 
heat and cold arise out of the employment in 
all jurisdictions if the exposure is 
accentuated by the nature and conditions of 
the employment, or, to use a familiar formula, 
if the exposure is greater than that to which 
the general public is subject. 
Larson, §8.40. Larson then emphasized the importance of 
defining the general public with which comparison is to be made 
broadly, "having no characteristics specially selected because 
they resemble those of the employment." Id. In other words, he 
stated that it is wholly inappropriate to compare the applicant 
to other individuals working in the same locality, i.e.: to 
compare Mr. Lancaster to other individuals also working at 
10,000 feet in blizzard conditions and in extremely cold 
temperatures. Rather, the appropriate comparison is the one 
made when one asks: 
What does the average man, free of the 
obligations of any particular employment , do 
when it is twenty below, or one hundred in the 
shade, or raining, sleeting, or snowing 
violently? There may be various answers as to 
what he does but there is one clear answer to 
what he does not do. He does not stay 
outdoors all day. (Emphasis added). 
The approach respondents would have this court take does not 
take into account the unusually severe weather conditions 
facing Mr. Lancaster on February 17th, and the additional time 
and effort required to accomplish his work activities because 
of the amount of fresh snow that had just recently fallen. 
These facts clearly indicate that while working on February 
17th, Mr. Lancaster was forced to exert himself to a much 
greater degree than the ordinary individual in the walk of 
everyday life, and, significantly, to a much greater degree 
than was usually required of him by his employment. Thus, he 
meets the requirements of any test, including the unusual 
exertion test, I n proving that he suffered an accident. 
C. A Review Of The Utah Cases Awarding Compensation For 
Employment-Related Heart Attacks Indicates That Mr. 
Lancaster Clearly Suffered An "Employment-Related 
Accident." 
This Court has found heart attacks to be 
compensable in Utah where the employment activity engaged in 
by the applicant has been far less strenuous than the 
employment activity engaged in by appellant Lancaster. For 
example, in Jones v. California Packing Corporation, supra, 
the deceased was a foreman at a pea viner. His job required 
him to work long hours during a short pea harvesting season. 
During one such season, after working long hours for a period 
of three or four straight days and after cranking a faulty 
booster motor in order to keep it operati ng, the deceased 
suffered a fatal heart attack. This court reversed a denial 
of benefits by the Commission and specifically rejected the 
Commission's finding that "'there [was] no evi dence of 
exertion or fatigue1 and that the 'deceased was not subjected 
to these factors in a degree materially in excess of the 
exertion, etc. to which all individuals in every walk of life 
or at home are subjected."1 Id. at 645. This Court also 
awarded benefits in Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 34 P.2d 
687 (Utah 1934) where the deceased died of heart failure two 
days after cleaning mud and gravel out of a water reservoir 
and after jumping in and out of the reservoir when necessary 
in order to let water in and out of various weirs. 
In a case with facts very similar to the facts in 
the case at bar, compensation was also awarded. In Columbia 
Steel Company v. Industrial Commission, 66 P.2d 124 (Utah 
1937) the deceased suffered heart failure after spending the 
day grating and leveling roads in a Caterpillar tractor 
equipped with a blade. That tractor, like the one driven by 
Lancaster, was hydraulically operated and the ride in the 
tractor, like the ride in Mr. Lancaster's case, was extremely 
rough and jarring. The Court found both that the deceased 
had suffered an accident and that his accident was employment-
related. Considering the similarities between Columbia and 
the present case, it is difficult to see how the facts can be 
distinguished sufficiently to uphold Judge Sumsion's 
conclusion that Mr. Lancaster suffered no compensable 
accident. 
Other cases, awarding or sustaining benefits for an 
industrial accident, include the following: In Robertson v. 
Industrial Commission, 163 P.2d 331 (Utah 1945) the decedent 
suffered heart failure after exerting himself by pulling on 
the leg of the carcass of a horse in an effort to turn the 
carcass over. In Powers v. Industrial Commission, supra, the 
applicant, a fireman, dressed quickly and ran to his fire 
truck after being called to a fire. He testified that he 
felt anxiety and nervousness on this particular occasion and 
that he subsequent] y experienced severe pain in his 
diaphragm. Although the applicant continued working for 
approximately six months after this incident, he eventually 
became disabled and the court reversed the Commission's 
denial of benefits stating that the applicant had clearly 
shown an accident within the meaning of the workmen's 
compensation statute. 
In Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining 
Corporation, 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) the decedent's fatal 
heart attack was found to be the result of an accident where, 
because of a malfunction in the dump truck he operated, he 
had been forced to get out his truck each time he dumped a 
load, go around to the opposite side of the truck and 
manually operate the control lever which raised the bed and 
then returi i to the cab climbing up three steps. 
Furthermore, in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Draper, 
613 P.2d 508 (Utah 1980), it was even found that the decedent 
- "i suffered an accident where, subsequent to running to the 
scene of an accident at his employment, he collapsed and died 
of a heart attack. See also IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 
P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) and Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. 
Keller, supra. 
After reviewing the Utah heart cases where an 
accident has been found and compensation has been awarded and 
after comparing the facts of those cases to the facts of the 
case at bar, it is apparent that Mr. Lancaster did indeed 
suffer an "accident11 on February 17th and that he has thus 
met the first prong of the test for compensation. 
POINT II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ARE ARBITRARY AND INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS INVOLVING HEART ATTACKS. 
In Point III of its brief, respondent The State 
Insurance Fund alleges there was sufficient conflicting 
evidence presented to the Commission for the Commission to 
reasonably conclude "there was no significant causal 
connection between Mr. Lancaster's work and his heart 
attack." (Emphasis added). (Respondents' Brief at 19.) 
Respondent's allegation errs on two points. First, Utah law 
does not require a significant causal connection between an 
applicant's employment and his injury before he is entitled 
to benefits. Second, all of the evidence relied on by 
Administrative Law Judge Sumsion in reaching his decision to 
deny benefits unequivocally establishes that Mr. Lancaster's 
employment activities on the day in question contributed to 
his myocardial infarction. 
A. An Applicant Who Suffers An Industrial Accident Need 
Only Show That His Employment Was A Contributing 
Cause Of His Injury In Order To Be Entitled To An 
Award of Benefits 
Utah Law does not require an applicant's employ ment 
to be the sole cause or even a significant cause of his 
injury before compensation can be awarded. In Champion Home 
Builders v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 14 i.ft • Ae:h , Rpt. 
14 (July 1985), this Court affirmed an award of benefits to 
an applicant who had suffered a perforated ulcer after 
lifting a heavy beam. The court first noted that the 
administrative law judge had found the applicant's lifti ng to 
be a cause of the ulcer perforation after analogizing it to 
hernia and heart attack cases where exertion is found to be a 
precipitating factor even though it is no t the sole cause of 
the hernia or heart attack. Id. at 15. The Court then went 
on to state: 
The governing statute is U.C.A., xys3, §35-1-
45, which provides for compensation or death 
benefits if an employee is injured or killed 'by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment.f Under that section, the claimant must 
prove that the work-related event was a 
contributing cause to the injury. (Citations 
omitted). (Emphasis added). 
Id. See also Higgins v. Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 
704, 706 (Utah 1985) ("Under this section, [U.C.A.,§35-1-
45] the claimant must prove that the work-related event was <a 
contributing cause of the injury, (Citations omitted). A 
contributing cause in workmen's compensation law is different 
from and broader than, the concept of proximate cause in tort 
law.11) 
The degree of causal connection required by the 
workmen's compensation act was also addressed in Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). The 
Court indicated therein that the requirement of causation is 
met so long as the employee's employment is at least a 
contributing cause: 
This Court's interpretation of 35-1-45 requires the 
existence of a causal connection between the injury 
and the employment. Justice Wade explained this 
requirement in Purity Biscuit: 
1
. . . in a case of this kind where the employee 
suffers an internal bodily failure or breakdown the 
burden is on the applicant to show that the 
exertion was at least a contributing cause thereof. 
In other words, . . . in cases where disease or 
internal failure causes or is the injury there must 
be a causal connection between the employment and 
the injury.' 
Id. at 695. 
In the instant case, it is clear from all of the 
medical testimony that Mr. Lancaster's work activities were a 
contributing cause of his heart attack. Although respondent 
continually stresses the fact that Dr. Perry assigned ninety 
percent of the causative factors involved to Mr. Lancaster's 
preexisting conditions and only ten percent to his work 
activities, ten percent causation is sufficient to sustain 
Mr. Lancaster's claim under Utah Law. U.C.A., §35-1-45 
does not require any particular degree of causation. It 
simply requires that a causative relationship between the 
applicant's employment and his injury be established. This 
relationship has been established and Mr. Lancaster is now 
entitled to benefits. 
B. All Of The Medical Evidence Relied Upon By Judge 
Sumsion Establishes A Causal Connection Between 
Lancaster's Myocardial Infarction And His 
Employment 
In support of its claim that there was conflicting 
medical evidence before the Commission sufficient to uphold 
its denial of benefits, respondent cites extensively from the 
report of Dr. Frank Dituri. However, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that Judge Sumsion relied upon Dr. Dituri in any 
way in reaching his final conclusions. In fact, i n his order 
Judge Sumsion expressly states: "The Administrative Law Judge 
adopts the findings of Dr. Perry as his own , . " (R at 
3 31.) Dr. Perry was the physician appointed by the 
Industrial Commission to act as the Medical Panel in this 
case. it is further significant to note that Dr. Dituri 
never examined Mr. Lancaster personally. His evaluation of 
the applicant's condition and its relation to hi s employ nient 
was based totally on a review of Mr. Lancaster's medical 
records. Dr. Dituri did not testify at any of the hearings 
held before the Industrial Commission, nor iid the respondent 
rely upon his claims at any of the proceedings below, Tt is 
only on appeal that the respondent, for the first time, 
attempts to show reliance on Dr. Diturifs report. Moreover, 
Dr. Dituri i s only an internist, not J tiained and 
experienced cardiologist as were the other testifying 
physicians. Therefore, his qualifications to evaluate the 
jausative ettect between Mi, Lancaster's work activities and 
his myocardial infarction are, at best, questionable Most 
importantly, Dr. Dituri gave his medical opinion prior to 
examining the applicant and prior to any of the evidentiary 
hearings before the Industrial Commission, and he was clearly 
unaware of significant facts regarding the accident as seen 
in his own report: 
I have reviewed Mr. Lancaster's statement, the 
pictures of the work area and a description of his 
occupation. It is my understanding, that on the 
morning of February 10, 1984, he was driving a 
backhoe. He was sitting in a heated cab and was 
using power controls. There was no indication that 
he performed any physical activity. (Emphasis 
added). 
(R. at 177.) It is apparent from this statement that Dr. 
Dituri, in concluding there was no causal relationship, did 
not take into account the blizzard conditions in which Mr. 
Lancaster was working on February 17th, including the strong 
winds, the heavy, deep snow through which he had to wade to 
arrive at and start his machines, and the unusually cold 
temperature. Neither did Dr. Dituri recognize that although 
the backhoe was hydraulically operated, the ride in the cab 
of the backhoe during the time Mr. Lancaster was clearing 
snow from the roadways was extremely rough and bumpy. 
Moreover, Dr. Dituri did not acknowledge the fact that Mr. 
Lancaster had climbed in and out of the backhoe on several 
occasions prior to suffering his heart attack and that this 
activity required him to maneuver two substantial steps each 
way. Finally, Mr. Lancaster's statement, upon which Dr. 
Dituri relies, was never introduced as evidence, and Mr. 
Lancaster's formal testimony and deposition were never 
presented to Dr. Dituri for review. These facts indicate 
that Mr. Lancaster had in fact engaged in substantial 
physical activity prior to his heart attack and that Dr. 
Dituri was not apprised of this information. In view of the 
questionable nature of Dr. Dituri's findings and the fact 
that Judge Sumsion did not rely upon them in any way in 
reaching a final decision in this case, Dr. Dituri's report 
cannot be seriously considered as a source of competent 
conflicting medical evidence which will sustain the 
Commission's ruling. 
The other so called conflicting evidence propounded 
by the respondent is Dr. Perry's testimony. As indicated 
previously, Judge Sumsion expressly adopted the findings of 
Dr. Perry as his own for purposes of his order. Dr. Perry 
performed an independent physical examination of Mr. 
Lancaster in early November 1984. Thereafter he submitted a 
medical panel report in response to questions posed by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Respondent cites Dr. Perry's 
written report for purposes of showing no cause and effect 
between Mr. Lancaster's employment and his "accident". 
However, timely objection was made to Dr. Perry's findings in 
that report and a hearing was then held to obtain his 
testimony and to clarify his answers to the written report. 
His testimony at that hearing undeniably assigns a ten 
percent causative factor to Lancaster's work activities in 
bringing on his myocardial infarction: 
Q. And generally speaking, in that report, you've 
assigned a 90 percent causative effect to what 
we've termed as the preexisting conditions; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And a 10 percent assignment of the causative 
impact to the altitude and the cold and the working 
conditions of February 17, 1984; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
(R. at 149.) Respondent attempts to discount this testimony 
by stating that Dr. Perry's ten percent figure was a "fairly 
random guess". (Respondents' Brief at 21.) The percentage 
assigned by Dr. Perry to Mr. Lancaster's employment, however, 
is not important for purposes of establishing causation. 
What is important is the fact that Dr. Perry's testimony 
clearly indicates Mr. Lancaster's work activities on 
February 17th contributed to his myocardial infarction. This 
causal link was established even during the direct 
examination of Dr. Perry by Dennis Lloyd, counsel for 
Respondent The State Insurance Fund: 
Q. (BY MR. LLOYD) The date that Mr. Lancaster 
suffered his heart attack while at Brian Head — I 
am corrected, is February 17, 1984, Dr. Perry. Can 
you tell us your opinion as to the causative impact 
of the events of February 17, 1984. 
A. Dealing from the standpoint of reasonable 
medical probability, there is a — if he has 
coronary disease, which we are again assuming, 
there is a given risk of having a myocardial 
infarction. 
People have myocardial infarctions in their sleep, 
after eating, while at work, virtually any time 
during a 24-hour period. The risk of having a 
myocardial infarction is enhanced somewhat by 
extreme or very strenuous exertion, things such as 
heavy lifting; that is lifting over 50 or 75 
pounds, or extreme emotional upset. Work less than 
that has never, medically speaking, been shown to 
be causally related to myocardial infarction. 
Nevertheless, when someone is out working fairly 
vigorously in cold weather, we are hesitant to say 
that was not related to the development of 
myocardial infarction. Cold weather tends to 
enhance what we call coronary spasm, which can 
precipitate a heart attack. And for a number of 
reasons, we're always — we are, as physicians, 
hesitant to say that, you know, work and cold 
weather, hasn't caused a myocardial infarction, 
even though that's really never been documented in 
epidemiologic studies. 
Given that he was likely to have an MI or heart 
attack because of his symptoms the five days 
beforehand, he had it while at work. I would just 
guess — to be perfectly honest, a fairly random 
guess — that the percentage increase risk of him 
having a heart attack from his work was at most ten 
percent. (Emphasis added). 
(R. at 124 and 125.) 
That the respondent recognizes the cause and effect 
relationship between Mr. Lancaster's work and his heart 
attack is evident in its brief: "[t]he medical panel in the 
person of Dr. J. Joseph Perry, offered testimony that 
indicates how minor the impact of cold and altitude was in 
causing Lancaster's heart attack." (Emphasis added). 
(Respondent's Brief at 21.) As has been pointed out 
previously, however, where there is a causal link established 
between the employee's injury and his work activity, the 
significance of the link is irrelevant. Thus, when Judge 
Sumsion adopted the findings of Dr. Perry as his own but 
denied benefits on the basis that Mr. Lancaster's work 
activities did not play "a significant role" in bringing on 
his heart attack, his ruling was arbitrary, capricious, and 
contrary to both the law and the evidence. It cannot be 
sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
Usual exertion in the course of employment which 
leads to a heart attack is sufficient to prove an accident 
under U.C.A., §35-1-45• However, even if the more 
stringent unusual-exertion test is applied, the appellant has 
shown he suffered an industrial accident. Furthermore, all 
relevant medical testimony before the Commission and upon 
which the Commission relied in reaching its decision to deny 
benefits clearly establishes a causal link between Mr. 
Lancaster's employment activities and his resulting 
myocardial infarction. An applicant is entitled to an award 
of benefits so long as he can prove the occurrence of an 
accident and the existence of a causal link between the 
injury suffered and his employment. In the instant case, Mr. 
Lancaster has met his burden of proof as to both prongs of 
the analysis required before compensation can be awarded. 
Therefore, he is entitled to an award of compensation as a 
matter of law. The Commission's denial of benefits is 
contrary to both the law and the evidence presented in this 
case, and its decision should be reversed. 
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